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M s . Mar y "I '. Noonan 
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 S. 500 E. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I am writii lg pursuant to Rule 24(j) . Utah Rul es of 
Appellate Procedure, to advise you of the recent decision of . 
the court of appeals in Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 
1990). The court held in Moon that the right to make future 
castings rf hronzes that were sculpted by the husband during 
the parties marriage was a marital asset: subject to equitable 
division in their divorce proceeding, even though the economic 
benefits of that right would only be realized, in the future. 
79 0 v ~ d ;:- • 5 8 5 7 P c o p y o f t h a t d e c i s i o n i s a 11 a c hed, 
The Moon decision is pertinent and significant to the 
pending appeal in Dunn v. Dunn, Case No, 880611-CA, from the 
district court's ruling that the right to fixed royalty 
payments under a 1icense agreement for surgical instruments 
that were designed by the husband and marketed under the 
license agreement during the marriage was the separate property 
of the husband and was not subject to equitable division in the 
parties 1 divorce. The Dunn appeal was argued on March 2, 1990 
before Judges Bi llings, Garff and Orme, The- issues raised by 
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t" s t r e a tme n t o f 1: h e r :i g 1 11 t o r o y a 11 i e s unde r 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
June 18, 1990 
Page 2 
the license agreement were specifically addressed in oral 
argument and at pages 9 to 11 and 23 to 24 of the Brief of 
Appellant, pages 9 to 11 and 22 to 25 of the Brief of 
Respondent, and pages 3 to 5 and 10 to 16 of the Reply Brief 
Very truly yours, 
[/fit^AS^iJ- 0 Y^tJLA ~~ 
Patricia A. O'Rorke 
PAO:bh 
Enclosure 
cc: Clark W. Sessions and 
Dean C. Andreason with enclosure 
51870 
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Susan MOON, Plaintiff; Appellant, n^d 
Cross-Respondent, 
r. 
Gary MOON, Defendant and 
Respondent 
Susan MOON, Plaintiff; Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Gary MOON, Defendant and Appellant 
Nos. 890051-CA, 890061-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 19, 1990. 
In divorce action, the Fourth Distt^ 
Court, Wasatch County, Boyd L. Park, j ^ 
awarded custody of children to fati^. 
awarded mother extensive visitation, diyjy. 
ed property and declined to require wife
 to 
pay child support Husband and wife ~^ 
pealed. The Court of Appeals, John F ^ . 
Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, held th^t 
(1) trial court did not abuse its discretion ^ 
awarding custody of children to father a^j 
awarding mother extensive visitation; ^) 
trial court did not abuse its discretion -m 
refusing to require mother to pay ch^j 
support in light of extensive visitat^Q 
awarded to her; (3) trial court prope^y 
held parties9 home to be marital asset si^. 
ject to equitable division, with except*^ 
of value of land given to husband by \^ 
parents; and (4) husband's rights in \^ 
sculptures were propertv subject to w 
uitable division. 
AJ&2BG& 
1. Parent and Child *=>2(&3, 3.4, ZJ&, 3.fi) 
Factors to consider in determinu^ 
"best interests" of child for custody pt^ 
poses include: need for stability in custoqj. 
al relationship and environment; maintai^ 
ing existing primary custodial bond; rela. 
tive strength of parental bonds; relative 
abilities of parents to provide care, supers 
skm, and suitable environment for chfldr^ 
and to meet needs of children; pref eren^ 
of child able to evaluate custody question .^ 
benefits of keeping siblings together, en-
abling sibling bonds to form; character and 
emotional stability of custodian; desire for 
custody; and apparent commitment of prt& 
posed custodian to parenting. 
2. Divorce <*=»299 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding custody of children to father 
and awarding mother extensive visitation^ 
both parents were well qualified for custom 
dy, but father offered more stability and 
more flexibility to arrange his time to care 
for children, custody with him accorded 
with oldest child's preference, and while 
mother was more able to assist oldest child, 
who suffered attention deficit disorder, in 
some academic respects, father was better 
able to teach child to work with his hands, 
to reinforce child's confidence, and to instill 
love of nature. 
3. Divorce <&=*306 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion^ 
in refusing to require noncustodial parent 
to pay child support in light of extensive 
visitation awarded to her; trial court in; 
tended that children divide their time 
roughly equally between their parents and 
noncustodial parent, therefore, continued 
to bear burden of providing for children 
that was roughly equal to that of custodial^  
parent U.OA.1953, 78-45-3, 78-45-4, 7% 
45^ -7(2), 
4. Divorce «=>252.2 
Appropriate considerations in dividing^  
property between divorcing parties indudeL 
amount and kind of property to be divided^ 
source of-property, parties'health,
 r—~l 
standard of living and respective finanaa 
conditions, their needs and earning 
ties, duration of marriage and relations^ 
of property to amount of alimony a 
U.CJL1953, 30-3-5(1). 
5. Divorce «=>252.5<1) 
Trial court properly held divorcing p&j 
ties' home to be marital asset subjefet&lf 
equitable division, with exception of vaHS 
of land given to husband by his parent? 
while husband may once have had separata 
obligation for home financing, that obB 
MOON 
Ctteat790 PJd J 
gation was fully discharged with marital 
funds. U.CJU953, 30-3-5(1). 
S. Divorce *»25&3(1) 
Divorcing husband's rights in his 
sculptures were property subject to eq-
uitable division even though economic bene-
fits would be realized in future; it was 
sufficient that right to reproduce creative 
rvork was capable of being validly assigned 
n present U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
r. Divorce «=»252L3<1) 
Right that is fully identifiable and 
ransferrable can be divided as marital 
>roperty, even though its full economic 
yenefits may be realized, if at all, only in 
xiture. U.CA.1953, 30-3-5. 
John Walsh (argued), Salt Lake City, for 
>usan Moon. 
David S. Dolowitz (argued) and M. Joy 
)ouglas, Salt Lake City, for Gary Moon. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
ARSON1, JJ. 
OPINION 
JOHN FARR LARSOtt, Senior 
uvenile Judge: 
Susan Moon appeals from the custody 
ward, and Gary Moon cross-appeals from 
le visitation award and the property divi-
ton of their decree of divorce. Gary Moon 
Iso appeals from the denial of child sup-
ort from Susan. We affirm. 
The parties were married in 1973. Short-
r
 thereafter, they settled in rural Wasatch 
ounty, where Gary Moon had been build-
ig a home on land given him by his par-
its. He had borrowed $21,000 to pay for 
taterials and labor, a debt that was paid 
T in 1979. The home was fully completed 
id enlarged during the marriage. The 
ridence conflicts concerning the value of 
ie home, and valuation based on original 
«t was difficult because the parties often 
irtered for needed materials. 
. MOON Utah 53 
E(UU&App. 1990) 
Gary Moon is a self-employed sculptor. 
He determines the amount of work lie does 
and the amount of income he makes, and 
his work output and income have fluctuat-
ed considerably. Some evidence indicated 
that when marital difficulties arose, Gary 
Moon intentionally decreased the amount 
of his work and thereby precipitated a fi-
nancial crisis in the family. In order to 
meet necessary household expenses at that 
time, Susan Moon took clerical employment 
in Park City, Utah, whOe Gary Moon re-
mained at home, where he had an art 
studio. Susan Moon is still thus employed. 
The Moons have three children ages 14, 
8, and 6. Both parents have close and 
loving relationships with their children. 
The trial court found that remaining with 
their father would present less disruption 
for the children than a shift to maternal 
custody, and remaining in their present 
home would enable them to continue rela-
tionships with their nearby extended fami-
ly. There were some indications that Su-
san Moon may be inclined to leave the 
Wasatch County area, in order to improve 
her education and employment prospects. 
The parties' oldest son, Jeral, expressed a 
desire to live with his father, and the other 
two children wanted to remain with their 
brother. 
Jeral has a psychophysiological ailment 
known as attention deficit disorder, which 
makes learning difficult for him, particular-
ly in the subjects of reading and mathemat-
ics. Both parents have worked with Jeral 
to ameliorate his problems. Susan Moon's 
efforts have focused mainly on reading, 
mathematics, medical treatment, and Jer-
al's social needs, whOe Gary Moon has 
helped Jeral to work with his hands, to 
have confidence, and to appreciate nature 
and his family. 
Two mental health experts testified at 
trial and expressed sharply conflicting 
opinions regarding prospective custody of 
the children. Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, a clin-
ical psychologist appointed by the court to 
perform a custody evaluation, noted that 
John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 7^-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
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each parent was a fit and proper person
 to 
have custody of the children but, since
 a 
choice was necessary, she recommend^ 
<fat tie &<&er fare eastx??. 3r. W.&s^n 
Belnap, a pediatric psychiatrist who h^j 
treated Jeral for over three years, came ^ 
precisely the opposite conclusion and r ^ 
ommended that Susan Moon have custo$w 
The district court resolved the custody 
dilemma in this case by placing all of t ^ 
children in the custody of Gary Moon, w ^ 
extensive, specified visitation by S u s ^ 
No child support was awarded Occupaw 
of the home was awarded to Gary, subj^ 
to certain conditions, and the equity in t^e 
home, less the value of the land gifted ^ 
Gary, was to be divided equally betw^n 
the parties upon an eventual sale of t ^ 
home. The rights to Gary's artistic wo*^ 
created during the marriage were also <jj_ 
vided between the parties. 
On appeal, Susan Moon argues mainu 
against the trial court's award of custody 
to Gary Moon. In his cross-appeal, Ga^ L 
challenges the visitation, the lade of chi^ 
support, and the property division. fye 
address first the custody and visitation ^ 
sues, then turn to consideration of t ^ 
property division. 
Custody and Visitation 
[1] Statute requires that a court det^ 
mining custody consider "the best interes^ 
of the child and the past conduct and de*^ 
interests" criterion to include the following 
factors:2 
The need for stability in custodial rela-
tionship and environment; maintaining 
an existing primary custodial bond; the 
relative strength of parental bonds,1 
The relative abilities of the parents to 
provide care, supervision, and a suitable 
environment for the children and to meet 
the needs of the children;4 
Preference of a child able to evaluate the 
custody question;1 
The benefits of keeping siblings togeth-
er, enabling sibling bonds to form;' 
The character and emotional stability of 
the custodian;7 and 
The desire for custody; the apparent 
commitment of the proposed custodian to 
parenting.8 
These factors are highfy persona) and 
individual, and do not lend themselves to 
the means of generalization employed in 
other areas of the law, such as quantifies 
tkm in money. As an appellate court, we 
are limited in our institutional ability to 
come to grips with these considerations, 
whereas the trial court is in a much bettei 
position to gain the necessary under-
standing to make the best decision possible 
under the circumstances. Therefore, ourr 
review of the trial court's assessment of. 
these factors is limited, and "we accord 
broad discretion to the trial court so that it 
onstrated moral standards of each of t ^
 mxj ^ ^ first-hand proximity to tne 
parties." Utah Code Ami. § 80-8-\0 
(1989). Case law has fleshed out the ~ 
2. This list is not exhaustive, and in making u 
merated set of concepts. See SchbuBer v. Schb 
dkr, TI6 P.2d 84 (Utah App.1989). *~ 
3. Davis v. Davis, 749 PJ2A 647, 648-49 (Ufa. 
1988); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Otaf 
1986); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 PJ2d 117, 120 (Ota? 
1986); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38. & 
(Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 ?2d 51, 
512 (Utah 1980); Ptayzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 7J 
(Utah App.1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d 97<° 
983 (Utah App.1989). 
4. Watt K WaH 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 198% EL 
win K Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah ApC 
1989); De&en v. Deehen, 772 P.2d 972, 97* 
(Utah App.1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d £ 
983. ^ 
parties to resolve the delicate and highh 
personal problems presented in custody cus-
5. Henderson v. Henderson, 576 ?2d 1289 (Utah 
1978X 
6L Jorgensen v. Jbrgensen, 599 P.2d 510. 512-5$ 
(Utah 1979) (Crockett, CJ„ concurring special 
lyfc Webonv.Coffman, 110 Utah U 169 ?2d§l 
(1946). 
7. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 33-3-10° 
(1989); Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 ?2d 623 (Utah4 
1987); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P2d at^41)$ 
Kotlas K Ratios, 614 ?2d 641 (Utah 1980). ^ 
8. State ex reL R— L—> 17 Utah 2d 349, 41 
P.2d839(1966k Walton* Cdffman, 110Ut 
169 P2d 97 (1946). 
MOON v. 
CtteM79tr.2dS2 
putes." Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847,849 
(Utah App.1989) (footnote omitted); see 
also Nutter v. Nutter, 688 P.2d 454, 455 
(Utah 1984). 
[2] In the instant case, the trial court 
carefully considered the foregoing factors 
and the best interests of the children. The 
choice was a difficult and apparently dose 
one, but we find in it no abuse of discre-
tion. Both parents were found to love 
their children and to be well qualified for 
custody. The primary custodian had in re-
sent months been the father, who was at 
home most of the time. In balancing the 
competing considerations to determine the 
>est interest of the children, the trial court 
found that the father offered, among other 
liings, more stability than the mother and 
nore flexibility to arrange his time to care 
or them. Custody with him accorded with 
eral's preference, and the younger chil-
Iren wished to remain with JeraL 
Jeral poses special considerations in de-
ermining custody because of his attention 
leficit disorder. Both parents had worked 
nth Jeral to mitigate difficulties associat-
d with his ailment It is true that Susan 
ras more able to assist Jeral in some aca-
emic respects, but Gary was found to be 
lore able to teach Jeral to work with his 
ands, to reinforce Jeral's confidence, and 
> instill a love of nature. While academic 
access is very important, children have 
ther needs and potential that should be 
iken into consideration, which the trial 
>urt appears to have done. The custody 
ward to Gary, coupled with the liberal 
sitation to Susan, is perhaps an attempt 
> provide the children the best of both 
orlds and enable them to benefit from the 
tmplementary parenting talents of both 
ary and Susan. 
Susan argues that she is, in effect, being 
tnalized for taking employment outside 
See generally Pusey v. Pusey, 728 ?2d 117 
[Utah 19S6); Marchant v. Merchant, 743 P-2d 
199, 204 (Utah App.1987). 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at tip. 
In particular, the trial court had to weigh the 
cstimony of Dr. Stewart and Dr. Belnap, who 
lad come to opposing conclusions. The trial 
*>urt, in light of all of the circumstances, chose 
MOON Utah 55 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
the home at variance with outmoded views 
of gender roles.f However, the trial court 
clearly intended no penalty and exhibited 
no gender bias. In a choice between two 
potential custodians, the effect of either 
custodian's employment on the best inter-
ests of the children may properly be con-
sidered.19 From the perspective of these 
children's best interests, there is an advan-
tage to custody with Gary in that he works 
where the children reside and has some 
scheduling flexibility to accommodate their 
needs. That advantage has nothing to do 
with gender stereotyping; the same advan-
tage would be realized if Susan were a 
self-employed sculptor working at home. 
We therefore conclude in relation to cus-
tody of the children that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding custo-
dy to Gary Moon. For the reasons we have 
noted above, and unless it appears that the 
trial court has given short shrift to the 
statutory criteria, we accord considerable 
discretion to the trial court in making a 
custody decision because of its first-hand 
proximity to the people involved. The val-
ue of that proximity is especially high in 
this case, where a choice must be made 
between two fine parents based on conflict-
ing evidence.11 Such a choice is difficult, 
but we must conclude that Susan has not 
demonstrated that the trial court's decision 
rises to the level of an abuse of discretion 
in granting custody to Gary but awarding 
her extensive visitation. 
The visitation order is generous, and was 
apparently intended to enable the children 
to spend roughly equal time with each par-
ent For the reasons noted above in rela-
tion to custody,^  and given the parenting 
abilities of both parents, the visitation 
schedule was not an abuse of the court's 
discretion.12 
to accept the recommendations of Dr. Stewart, 
which is the prerogative of the finder of fact 
State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1245-46 (Utah 
1988); Myers v. Myers, 768 ?2d 979, 984 (Utah 
1988). 
12. It was apparent that the parents were not on 
very good terms with each other and that the 
frequency of visitation may engender competi-
tion between the parents for the love and affec-
56 Utah 790 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Child Support 
[3] Parents have a fundamental duty to 
support.their chfldren. Utah,Code AiF* 
not shared by the parents in a comn*on 
household, a judicial decree allocating tF8 
duty between the parents may be nec^ 8" 
sary, in order to assure the children °* 
adequate support without unfairly burd^n" 
ing one parent In making that allocate 
the court is statutorily directed to considar 
(a) the standard of living and situation °* 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of v"e 
parties; 
(c) tbe ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to ea*11' 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor >or 
the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7 § (2) (1987). Ap-
pellate courts have reversed decisions o n 
child support where a trial court has f a*^ 
to follow these statutory mandates.13 S#c" 
is not the case here, however. 
It is true that the trial court in this c^ e 
awarded no child support to Gary Mo011* 
who received custody of the chfldi^ n-
However, the court was cognizant that ^e 
children would be spending a great a m o ^ 
of their time in Susan Moon's care, in vi^w 
of the extensive visitation awarded to l*er* 
As noted above, the trial court intend 
that the children divide their time rougw 
equally between their parents. Su f^11 
Moon therefore continues to bear in realty 
a burden of providing for her children tfe** 
consideration of the award of the home *° 
Gary Moon and of the other facts bearing 
on tbe above-fisted statutory factors, tbe r e 
tion of these children. Children should be «*". 
forded tbe opportunity to live happily in t~ 
world of each parent Wise parents have *** 
best interests of their children at heart and *** 
careful not to undermine' the children's *"* 
giance to the other parent 
13. E*. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, ^SS 
(Utah App.1983); Jefferies v.Jefferies, 752 fM 
909, 911 (Utah App.1988). . 
is no abuse of discretion in the trial 
refusal to award child support fmm 
Moon to Gary Moon. 
M 
Property Division 
[4] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1^ 
requires that the property 
"equitable," see also Noble v. 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). Thev 
purpose of the property 
enable the former spouses to pursSe 
separate lives as well as possible.14: 
priate considerations "in dividing ^ __^ 
include the amount and kind of property^! 
be divided, the source of the property;^ 
parties9 health, the parties' standard of Bvj 
ing and respective financial condEtms; 
their needs and earning capacities, the <hh 
ration of the marriage, and the relationship 
the property has with the amount of aftfiiS 
ny awarded.16 
(5\ TXSL telatiau ta tfc& ^ taxjertaj <ttsg3csgk 
in this case, Gary Moon argues that*IB| 
trial court erred in awarding to Susan! 
Moon half the eventual proceeds xrf^^ 
marital home less an amount attribiKa^ 
to the value of the gifted land.1* ^ 4 ^ ^ 
maintains that tbe home was financed^ 
large part by funds he separately bor 
before the marriage. However, 
he may once have had a separate obligation 
for the home financing, he lias fully Ids*] 
charged that obligation with marital funds*) 
his home loan was entirely paid off during? 
the marriage. Except for the value of the 
land given Gary by his parents, the trad] 
court properly held the home to be a mark 
tal asset subject to equitable division ixpam 
divorce. 
(&JI Gar^  Moon al&Q chaJOLeiiJj^ 'theL 
award to Susan Moon of the 
statues that Gary had sculpted 
the right to cast bronzes from 
14. Burke v. Burke, 733 ?2d 133. 135 (Utah 
19S7); see Smith v. Smith 751 P.2d 1149. \VSt 
(Utah App.1988). 
15. Naranjo v. tkamjo, 751 PJd 1144. 1147^8 
(Utah App.1988). 
16. Gary also questions the apportionment OL 
value between tbe raw land gifted to him as Ittf 
separate property and the improvements ttrfhgj 
land. We do not find the trial court's valuation 
to be clearly erroneous. 
WH1TEH0USE v. 
Cite
 M 799 T2& 57 
verting that the' right to make future 
jstings is not property that can be divided 
etween divorcing spouses under section 
3-5-5, smce its economic benefits will be 
>alized in the future. However, an asset 
istributable under section 30-3-5 need not 
e readily and immediately convertible into 
loney. It is enough that the right to 
p^roduce a creative work is a right capa-
le of being validly assigned in the 
resent17 A right that is thus fuDy identi-
able and transferable can be divided as 
larital property, even though its full eco-
omic benefits may be realized, if at all, 
oly in the future.18 Gary Moon's rights in 
is sculptures are therefore property sub-
let to equitable division in divorce pursu-
nt to section 30-3-5. 
In conclusion, the trial court in this case 
cted within its discretion in awarding cus-
xly of the children to Gary Moon with 
beral visitation to Susan Moon and with-
ut child support The court also acted 
rithin its discretion in dividing the parties9 
roperty. This court therefore affirms the 
arties* divorce decree in all respects, the 
arties to bear their own costs and attor-
ey fees on appeal. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
!KEr«UMKtSYSTlM> 
Ted Sherill WHITEHOUSE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Kathleen Shields WHITEHOUSE. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 880491-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 21, 1990. 
In divorce proceeding, former wife ap-
pealed from order of the Third District 
7. £ £ , Wah Disney Prods, v. Basmajfctn, 600 
RSupp. 439 (D.N.Y.. 1984); NUcaCbrp. * City of 
Kansas Oty, Mo±S$2 F-Supp. 343 <DJ&xl983X 
S. See, e&, Gardner v. Gardner, 74S F2d 1076 
(Utah 1983) (business good will); Sorensen v. 
WHITEHOUSE Utah J 
(UtallApp. 1990) 
Court, Tooele Conner, J. Dennis Frederick, 
J., which granted former husband's petition 
to modify decree. *Tbe Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that (1) original decree 
unambiguously gave husband contingent 
interest family home and, thus, trial court's 
modification of family home equity provi-
sions could not be upheld on theory of 
reformation, and (2) trial court's findings 
and uncontested evidence concerning 
changed circumstances did not support 
modification of home equity provisions or 
retirement provisions of original divorce de-
cree 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Husband and Wife *=»279<1) 
Reformation of Instruments €=»16 
Original divorce decree, premised on 
parties' stipulation, unambiguously gave 
husband contingent interest in family home 
and, thus, trial court's modification of fami-
ly home equity provisions could not be up-
held on theory of reformation; decree statr 
ed that wife was to receive house, "subject 
to [husband's] interest in one half of the 
equity of said residenceT existing as of the 
date of the divorce • * * conditioned upon 
[wife] selling said residence or remarrying 
within seven and one half yeara • * • , f 
2. Divorce *=>254(2) 
Deficiency in divorce decree which 
failed to provide time for payment of wife's 
interest in husband's retirement fund 
would justify trial court supplying missing 
terms on timing of payment 
X Divorce *=>164 
uourt nas conunuing jurisdiction to 
modify divorce decree, but party request-
ing that decree be modified must demon-
strate that there has been substantial 
change of circumstances occurring since 
Sorensen, 769 P^d 320, 823-24 (Utah App. 
1989)), (good will and receivables); Woodward 
v. Woodwud. 656 P.2d43HUtah 1982) (retire-
ment funds). 
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk, Utah Court o 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84] 02 
Re: Dunn v. Dunn, Case No 880611-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I am writing pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to advise you of the recent decision of 
the court of appeals in Morgan v. Morgan, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(1990). The Morgan decision is pertinent and significant to 
the pending appeal in Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. 880611-CA. 
The court held in the Morgan case that marital assets 
should be valued as of the time of the divorce decree; it 
remanded for additional findings on the valuation of bank 
accounts which the trial court had valued on the basis of 
pretrial bank statements that did not reflect their value at 
the time of trial. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37-38. This ruling 
is pertinent to the appeal of the valuation and division of 
retirement benefits in the Dunn case, where the benefits 
accrued in three separate retirement plans were valued and 
divided on the basis of statements that had been prepared in 
February, March, and December of 1987, and admittedly did not 
reflect the contributions and accruals made between the 
statement dates and the May 1988 trial. 
Ms, Mary T. Noonan 
July 9, 1990 
Page Two 
The Dunn appeal was argued on March 2, 1990, before 
Judges Billings, Garff and Orme. The valuation and division 
of the retirement benefits were specifically addressed in oral 
argument and at pages 12 to 13 and 25 to 27 of the Brief of 
Appellant, pages 11 to 13 and 25 to 28 of the Brief of 
Respondent,, and, pages 20 to 22 of the Rep] y Brief, 
Very truly yours, 
&&t±Jl6,&Jk<~ 
• Patricia A O'Rorke 
PAO:cp 
cc: Clark W. Sessions and 
Dean C. Andreason with enclosure 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Brief of Respondents urges this court to uphold the 
trial court's judgment based upon two premises which are directly 
contrary to the established law of Utah governing the division of 
property in a divorce. First, they seek affirmance of the trial 
court's holding that a spouse who brings superior earning capacity 
into a marriage is entitled to retain the property acquired with 
his earnings during the marriage as his separate property. 
Second, they argue that there are no standards limiting the extent 
to which property acquired with the marital earnings of an 
economically talented husband may be disproportionately awarded to 
him, even when there are no compensating factors to equalize the 
parties' circumstances after the divorce. Both of those premises 
are directly contrary to Utah law. In this case, they resulted in 
substantial and prejudicial error. 
None of the property at issue in this appeal was owned at 
the time of the marriage or received by gift or inheritance during 
the marriage. It is all property that was acquired during the 
marriage with marital income. Yet, the trial court excluded a 
substantial amount of that property from the marital estate. It 
did so on the premise that property acquired during the marriage 
through the application of knowledge, skills or expertise which 
Dr. Dunn brought to the marriage should be treated as his separate 
property. This dramatic expansion of the definition of separate 
property cannot be reconciled with the established law that 
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property acquired through the employment of either spouse during 
the marriage should be divided equitably. 
Focusing exclusively on the economic talents and 
contributions of each party, the trial court awarded most of the 
economic assets to the spouse who was economically favored with 
superior earning ability and separate property. Its property 
division was based on the principle that the parties' post-divorce 
living standards should not be equalized. Its objective was to 
return the parties to their disparate standards of living before 
the marriage, rather than to continue to the extent possible the 
standard of living they enjoyed during their eleven years 
together. Such intentional disproportion in favor of an 
economically gifted spouse, when there are no compensating factors 
favoring the other spouse, violates the standards established for 
the equitable division of property under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988). 
This misapplication of Utah law resulted in substantial 
and prejudicial inequity. By treating the most substantial assets 
acquired during the marriage as Dr. Dunn's separate property, and 
awarding 67 percent of the remainder to Dr. Dunn as well, the 
trial court favored him by a four-to-one ratio. The result was, 
as intended, a radical reduction in Mrs. Dunn's financial 
resources and standard of living, while Dr. Dunn's economic 
circumstances were barely affected by the divorce. Because the 
trial court misapplied Utah law with inequitable and prejudicial 
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results, the property distribution should be reversed. Beraer v. 
Beraer, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED UTAH LAW. 
A. The Trial Court Misapplied Utah Law By Treating 
Assets Acquired As A Result Of Dr. Dunn's 
Professional Work Purina The Marriage As His 
Separate Property. 
By adopting Dr. Dunn's argument that property acquired 
through his professional efforts during the marriage should be 
treated as his separate property, the trial court misapplied Utah 
law. The pooling of individual knowledge, skills and expertise is 
the very essence of marriage, and its economic fruits are marital 
assets. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Lee v. 
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Utah supreme court has consistently held that 
"[m]arital property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived. . . .'" Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988) (citation omitted). The essential criterion which 
distinguishes marital property from separate property is "whether 
a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part 
during the marriage." Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 
(Utah 1982); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17-18 
(Utah App. 1989). Even intangible property rights accrued by a 
professional spouse's efforts during the marriage are marital 
property to be included in the marital estate. Gardner v. 
Gardner, supra; Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
-3-
16-18. See also Lee v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 
1987). 
Respondents do not cite a single authority which even 
suggests that property attained through one spouse's employment 
during a marriage should be treated as that spouse's separate 
property. The cases cited in Respondents' Brief only treat as 
separate property assets which one spouse owned at the time of the 
marriage or received through gift or inheritance after the 
marriage. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) 
(property received through gifts and inheritances); Newmever v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (property received through 
inheritance); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) (property 
received through inheritance); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 
326 (Utah 1980) (property owned at time of marriage). 
Respondents' reliance on Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 
237 (Utah App. 1987), is also misplaced. Petersen held that a 
medical degree is not in itself marital property subject to 
division,, But it also held that the earning capacity derived from 
a medical degree should be considered with the objective of 
equalizing the parties' circumstances after the divorce. Accord 
Ravburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). 
Mrs. Dunn claims no interest in Dr. Dunn's medical 
degree. But the fact that he earned his degree before the 
marriage certainly does not mean that all of the property acquired 
with his professional earnings during the marriage are his 
separate property. Were each spouse entitled to retain all of the 
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property acquired with his earnings during the marriage, the 
statutory policy of dividing property equitably between employed 
and unemployed spouses would be completely obviated. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988). 
B. The Trial Court Misapplied Utah Law By Making 
A Severely Disproportionate Property Division 
In Favor Of Dr. Dunn, When There Were No 
Compensating Economic Factors Favoring Mrs. 
Dunn, On The Ground That Mrs. Dunn Had Enioved 
A Standard Of Living Bevond Her Own Earning 
Capacity During The Marriage. 
The trial court considered Dr. Dunn's superior earning 
ability and substantial premarital property reason to award him 
most of the property acquired during the marriage. With the 
objective of dividing the property unequally to reflect the 
parties* differing standards of living before the marriage, the 
trial court first excluded over $494,000 worth of property 
acquired during the marriage as "separate propertyH of Dr. 
2 
Dunn, and then awarded two-thirds of the remaining property to 
1
 This includes a ranch with a net equity of $245,000, 
as well as the valuable good will and accounts receivable of 
his professional corporation, all of which were determined to 
be premarital assets. 
2
 This includes the interest in the December 1, 1985 
License Agreement worth $232,572; the hard assets of the 
professional corporation worth $115,845, contributions to Dr. 
Dunn's retirement plans between February 1987 and the time of 
trial, the value of which is unknown; $90,908 worth of 
retirement benefits accrued during the marriage but attributed 
to accruals on premarital contributions; and credits of $55,093 
against a jointly held promissory note acquired in 1984, an 
airplane purchased in 1983, and two automobiles purchased in 
1983 and 1986. 
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him as well. Although Mrs. Dunn had no separate assets or 
income, received only three years' alimony, and was required to 
pay her own attorney fees, she was awarded less than 24 percent of 
the marital estate. This cannot be reconciled with the standards 
established by the Utah supreme court and this court for the 
equitable division of property under Section 30-3-5(1). 
There is no dispute about the facts. The parties had no 
children, and Dr. Dunn refused to adopt any. Mrs. Dunn quit her 
job in 1979, and thereafter devoted all of her efforts to 
non-income producing activities. She assumed all of the 
responsibility for maintaining the home, preparing the meals, 
attending to the parties' financial accounts and investments, and 
all the other normal duties of a housewife. In addition, she 
performed clerical and bookkeeping services for the professional 
corporation, entertained Dr. Dunn's professional associates, and 
traveled with Dr. Dunn to professional meetings. Those supportive 
activities left Dr. Dunn free to devote all of his time to his 
ongoing career, but produced no separate income. Testimony of Dr. 
Dunn, R000240 at 9-19; Testimony of Mrs. Dunn, R000242 at 113-120; 
Brief of Respondents at 6-7. 
The trial court discounted those non-income producing 
activities. Focusing on Dr. Dunn's professional relationships, 
3
 Appellant calculates the award of the remaining 
property as 67 percent - 33 percent, while Respondents 
calculate it as 62 percent - 38 percent. See Appendix 1 to 
Brief of Appellant and Appendix 1 to Brief of Respondents. 
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rather than the marital relationship between the parties, it found 
that Mrs. Dunn's efforts had not been -required- for Dr. Dunn's 
success. But Mrs. Dunn was the doctor's wife, not his business 
partner. Whether or not it mattered to his professional 
colleagues that she traveled with him to meetings and supported 
his career, it mattered to him. It is undisputed that Dr. Dunn 
expected Mrs. Dunn to travel with him to meetings and to perform 
the other domestic, clerical and social duties she assumed during 
the marriage. Her efforts to meet those expectations were an 
essential part of their marital contract. R000242 at 122, 162, 
184; R000240 at 9-19. 
The Supreme Court of Utah and this court have 
consistently held that, whether both parties are employed or one 
spouse works while the other performs a supportive role, the 
overriding objective of a trial court in dividing marital assets 
is to to allow both parties to continue the standard of living 
they enjoyed during the marriage to the extent possible. Gardner 
v. Gardner, supra, 748 P.2d at 1078; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). Otherwise, the contributions made by 
a nonprofessional spouse to the success of a professional spouse 
would be ignored, a result which has never been allowed under Utah 
law. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 at 18. 
To be sure, the division of property need not be 
mathematically equal, but equality — not disequality — is the 
objective. E.g., Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 
1988); Sorenson v. Sorenson, supra, 109 Utah. Adv. Rep. at 20. 
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The only time an intentional disproportion in the division of 
property has been allowed in recent cases is when the 
disproportionate award compensated for other economic factors in 
order to make the overall effect of the divorce decree equitable 
to both parties. In the absence of compensating factors tending 
to equalize the imbalance, disproportionate distributions of 
property have consistently been reversed. E.g., Gardner v. 
Gardner, supra. 
The cases cited in the Brief of Respondents reflect tnose 
established standards. In Petersen v. Petersen, supra, this court 
held that the husband's medical degree was not marital property, 
but it approved the trial court's effort to divide the marital 
property equally. I£., 737 P.2d at 242-43, citing Savage v. 
Savage, supra. In Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment because, 
like the judgment in this case, it was based on distorted 
valuations which resulted in one spouse receiving less than 40 
percent of the marital estate. 
The only cases cited by Respondents which support their 
position are old opinions which do not reflect the current law of 
Utah. For example, Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975), decided 
14 years ago, approved the old "rule of thumb" by which one-third 
of the marital assets were awarded to the wife and two-thirds were 
awarded to the husband. !£., 532 P.2d at 997. No recent Utah 
cases have referred to such a "rule of thumb" as an appropriate 
basis for dividing marital property in a divorce. MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), decided 38 years 
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ago, held that when a wife was found -guilty of habitual 
drunkenness,M her fault was not to be disregarded in determining 
4 
her rights to marital property. That is also contrary to 
current Utah law. E.g., Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra. 
Other cases cited by the Respondents involved equitable 
factors weighing against the party who was disfavored in the 
property division. For example, in Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), the wife was 68 years old and had limited 
assets at the time of the marriage, while the husband was 73 and 
had no assets. The marriage lasted only five years, during which 
the husband was guilty of constant misconduct, and after which he 
claimed that his elderly wife had given him her pre-marital 
property. In Whisoell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 3d 
Dept. 1988), the court upheld a disproportionate property division 
on the basis of the husband's -sporadic employment, indolence, 
immoderate drinking, and generally negative contribution to the 
marriage,- and his -threats to make things difficult for [the 
wife's] son[.]M Id., 534 N.Y.S.2d at 558. In this case, there 
were no such equitable factors weighing against Mrs. Dunn. To the 
contrary, having been abandoned by her husband without fault on 
her part and without any separate assets or significant earning 
capacity, all equities weighed in her favor. 
4
 In addition, the wife in MacDonald had received one 
inheritance and was expected to receive another. Nevertheless, 
she was awarded a larger share of the total marital assets than 
the husband. Id., 236 P.2d at 1070. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW 
RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INEQUITY. 
The trial court not only excluded from the marital estate 
the entire value of the December 1, 1985 License Agreement, the 
hard assets of the professional corporation, and a substantial 
portion of the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage, it 
also awarded 67 percent of the remaining marital assets to Dr. 
Dunn. Because there were no compensating factors favoring Mrs. 
Dunn, the overall effect of the exclusions, credits and awards of 
property in favor of Dr. Dunn resulted in a manifest inequity. 
A. It Was Error To Exclude The Entire Value Of The 
December 1, 1985 License Agreement From The 
Marital Estate* 
Respondents concede that marital property includes 
royalty rights on inventions derived from the creative efforts, 
time and skill of either spouse during the marriage. Worth v. 
Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 
1987); Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978); Brief of 
Respondents at 22. They also concede that Dr. Dunn's right to 
royalties under the December 1, 1985 License Agreement derived 
from his efforts, time and skill in designing the surgical 
instruments during his marriage to Mrs. Dunn. Brief of 
Respondents at 5. Given these admissions, it is clear that the 
royalty rights should not have been treated as his separate 
property. 
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1* The License Agreement Is Unambiguous And 
Does Not Reguire Personal Services. 
Manifestly, the License Agreement gives Dr. Dunn the 
right to fixed royalties of $50,000 in 1986, $62,500 in 1987, 
$75,000 in 1988, $87,500 in 1989, and $100,000 in 1990, as 
consideration for a license to use the surgical instruments. The 
only conditions to payment are that Zimmer continue the 
instruments in its product line and maintain sales of the 
Miller-Galante knee at a certain level. Trial Exhibit P-4, §§ III 
and IV. 
Respondents admit that there is absolutely no requirement 
in the License Agreement that Dr. Dunn perform any services to 
receive the royalty payments. Brief of Respondents at 10. But 
they urge this court to affirm the trial court's decision to 
exclude the entire value of the License Agreement from the marital 
estate, based upon Dr. Dunn's uncorroborated testimony that he 
traveled approximately 21 days during the preceding year in 
connection with promotional services for the surgical 
instruments. R000240 at 43-44. This violates the basic tenets of 
contract law. 
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that, in 
order to preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent 
of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the 
instrument itself. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 
1061 (Utah 1981) . When the plain language of the contract is 
unambiguous, parol evidence cannot be considered to give it a 
different meaning. As the Utah supreme court emphasized in 
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Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958), H[i]t 
would defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to permit a 
party to invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent with its 
terms to prove that the parties did not mean what they said, or to 
use such inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty 
or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist.M Once the parties 
have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain 
agreement, it is presumed to be their entire agreement, and parol 
evidence is not admissible for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of the written document. Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d 
769, 770-71 (Utah 1969). 
Respondents argue that the unambiguous terms of the 
License Agreement were properly disregarded, based upon EIE v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). But EIE states 
that an apparently complete and certain agreement will be 
conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement and parol 
evidence will not be received to vary or add to its terms. 638 
P.2d at 1194. EIE varied this rule only because the agreement in 
question was not integrated. I£. Because the License Agreement 
in this case contains an integration clause, EIE is not 
applicable. 
This court may read and interpret the License Agreement 
for itself. Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, supra, 321 P.2d at 
223. It plainly does not require personal services as a condition 
to payment, and it was error for the trial court to find otherwise. 
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2. Even If Some Personal Services Were 
Required, The Royalty Interest Would 
Still Be Marital Property. 
The Brief of Respondents fails to cite a single authority 
which even suggests that a royalty interest which accrued during a 
marriage should be treated as separate property if the creator 
spouse performs some promotional services in connection with it. 
To the contrary, Respondents concede that Wilkins v. Stout, supra, 
and Worth v. Worth, supra, correctly state the applicable law. 
Brief of Respondents at 22. Both of those cases establish that a 
royalty interest accrued during a marriage is marital property, 
even if continuing services on the part of the creator spouse are 
expressly required under the terms of the license. 
In Wilkins. the husband was an author who had written a 
number of textbooks during the marriage. The wife had assisted 
with some clerical functions, but had not written any part of the 
books. The husband's royalty contract with his publisher 
expressly required him to revise the books every three years. 
Despite this express requirement of continuing services, the 
Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's holding that the 
entire royalty interest in all of the books published during the 
marriage had properly been included in the marital estate. Id. 
In Worth, the California court similarly held that, like any other 
property interest, a copyright interest based upon an artistic 
work created during the marriage is marital property. Id., 241 
Cal. Rptr. at 137. See also Howes v. Howes, 436 So.2d 689 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 441 So.2d 216 (La. 1983) (license 
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for use of invention which the husband developed and patented 
during the marriage held to be marital property). 
The Respondents' reliance on Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), is misplaced. Woodward held unambiguously 
that a property interest accrued during a marriage must be 
included in the marital estate, even if its benefits will not be 
received until one spouse performs continued services after the 
divorce. 
"'The right to receive monies in the future is 
unquestionably . . . an economic resource* 
subject to equitable distribution based upon 
proper computation of its present dollar value.H 
Whether that resource is subject to distribution 
does not turn on whether the spouse can presently 
use or control it, or on whether the resource can 
be given a present dollar value. The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or 
asset has accrued in whole or in part during the 
marriage. To the extent that the right has so 
accrued, it is subject to equitable distribution. 
Id., 656 P.2d at 432-33 (emphasis in original, citations 
omitted). This court applied the same principle in the Sorenson 
case, holding that the good will of a professional corporation is 
marital property even though it is an intangible interest based 
upon an expectation of continuing services. I£. / 102 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 16-18. 
Thus, it was clear error to exclude the entire value of 
the License Agreement without valuation, based upon Dr. Dunn's 
testimony that he performed some promotional services in 
connection with the surgical instruments. This is the fourth yer 
of the five-year Agreement in which the fixed payments have been 
made under the unambiguous contract language. Dr. Dunn's 
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occasional attendance at a Zimmer workshop will not change the 
character of the royalty interest accrued during the marriage from 
marital to separate property. 
3. A Royalty Interest Accrued During The 
Marriage Is Marital Property Regardless Of 
When The Underlying Knowledge And Skills 
Were Acquired. 
Respondents assert that the interest in the License 
Agreement was properly excluded from the marital estate because 
Dr. Dunn had acquired most of the knowledge, skill and expertise 
needed to design the surgical instruments before he married Mrs. 
Dunn. See Brief of Respondents at 22. But the issue is not when 
he acquired the knowledge, skill or expertise — it is whether the 
invention was derived from the application of that knowledge, 
skill and expertise during the marriage, which is admittedly the 
case here. 
There is no statutory exception for creative spouses 
under Section 30-3-5(1), and none has ever been implied by the 
Utah courts. Whatever knowledge, skill or expertise a person 
brings into a marriage, he takes with him. But property right 
accrued during marriage by the application of his talents are 
subject to equitable division under Section 30-3-5(1). Wilkins v. 
Stout, supra. 
It makes no difference that Mrs. Dunn did not participate 
in the design of the surgical instruments. As the court stated in 
Worth v. Worth, supra, -joint or qualitatively equal spousal 
efforts or contributions in acquiring the property" are not 
required for the property to be considered marital; Mit is enough 
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that the skill and effort of one spouse during the marriage 
resulted in the creation or acquisition of a property interest." 
Id., 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136-137. Thus, it was error to exclude Dr. 
Dunn's interest in the License Agreement from the marital estate 
without calculation. Gardner v. Gardner, supra. 
B. The Hard Assets Of The Professional Corporation 
Were Acquired During The Marriage And Should Be 
Included In The Marital Estate. 
1. The Assets In Question Were Clearly 
Acquired During The Marriage. 
Dr. Dunn's accountant, Keith Barnett, valued the hard 
assets of the professional corporation at $115,845 as of March 31, 
1988. This included $79,000 in the corporation's bank account, a 
$53,224 receivable from Dr. Dunn, and $13,935 for the book value 
of artwork and furnishings, less $30,314 in current liabilities. 
R000241 at 63-67. All of those items were accrued during the 
marriage. 
The cash in the bank account was obviously acquired 
during the marriage; the corporation's March 31, 1987 financial 
statement reflected only $9,282 in the account as of that date. 
Trial Exhibit P-3. The $53,224 receivable from Dr. Dunn was based 
on advances he had taken from the corporation as loans rather than 
income. The trial court treated the receivable as a marital 
obligation of Dr. Dunn. The March 31, 1987 financial statement 
reflected the receivable at only $21,081, indicating that more 
than half those advances were taken in the year preceding the 
trial. Trial Exhibit P-3. Moreover, the trial court treated the 
corresponding payable as a marital obligation. R000221. The 
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artwork and furnishings were purchased for the corporation's 
5 
office in the home the parties built in 1984, R000241 at 33, 
and the corporate tax returns reflect that no depreciable 
furnishings were acquired before 1981. Trial Exhibit P-l. The 
current liabilities were paid before the trial. R000241 at 64. 
Based entirely on these Hhard assets" acquired during the 
marriage, Mr. Barnett testified that he would advise another 
physician to pay Dr. Dunn $115,845 for his medical practice. 
R000241 at 67. It was error for the trial court to exclude them 
from the marital estate without valuation. Gardner v. Gardner, 
supra. 
2. There Is No Evidence Whatsoever In The 
Record To Support The Exclusion Of The 
Corporation's "Hard Assets" As Separate 
Property Of Dr. Dunn. 
No evidence was ever produced or offered concerning any 
hard assets which Dr. Dunn might have had in his medical practice 
at the time of the parties' marriage in 1977. See R000240 at 25. 
Dr. Dunn testified about the approximate value of his accounts 
receivable before the marriage, but accounts receivable were not 
included in Mr. Barnett's valuation. R000241 at 65-66. He also 
testified about his billing rates before the marriage, but at most 
those billing rates only relate to the good will value of the 
practice, which was not included in Mr. Barnett's valuation 
either. R000241 at 29-30, and 39-41. 
s The book value of the artwork and furnishings was 
$41,912 only one year before the trial. Trial Exhibit P-3. 
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The Brief of Respondents asserts that Mrs. Dunn's expert, 
Blaine Nelson, valued Dr. Dunn's practice before the marriage in a 
manner that supports the trial court's ruling. That is not so. 
Mr. Nelson did value Dr. Dunn's practice at the time of the 
marriage and the time of trial, but his valuation was based upon a 
capitalization of Dr. Dunn's medical income. Mr. Nelson concluded 
that the value of the practice had increased by $377,831 during 
the marriage, from $135,706 as of December 31, 1977, to $513,537 
as of March 31, 1988. R000240 at 21, 22-34, Trial Exhibit P-17. 
Based upon Mr. Nelson's testimony, the value of the practice to be 
included in the marital estate was $377,931, not $0. The good 
will value he attributed to the practice at the time of the 
marriage cannot be used to reduce the value of hard assets 
acquired during the marriage. Thus, there was no evidence to 
support the treatment of those hard assets as separate property of 
Dr. Dunn. 
3. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of The 
Corporation's Hard Assets Cannot Be 
Reconciled With The Governing Case Law. 
The trial court made no attempt to value Dr. Dunn's 
practice. It excluded all of the assets of the professional 
corporation from the marital estate as separate property because 
Dr. Dunn had a medical practice before the marriage. Under the 
supreme court's opinion in Gardner v. Gardner, supra, this was 
plain error. 
This court's recent opinion in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 
supra, establishes that even intangible assets of a professional 
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practice should be valued by the trial court. Like Dr. Dunn's 
medical practice, the dental practice in Sorenson had been 
established well before the marriage. But unlike this case, the 
trial court in Sorenson valued all of the assets of that practice, 
making a prorata adjustment for its premarital value and awarding 
offsetting property of equal value to the wife. In upholding the 
trial court's valuation, this court rejected the husband's 
argument that the good will and accounts receivable flowing from 
his individual talents should not be treated as marital assets. 
Id., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
The same policy was applied in Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 
(Utah App. 1987), which reversed the exclusion of the husband's 
interest in a business from the marital estate without valuation. 
The Brief of Respondents seeks to distinguish Lee on the ground 
that the business in that case was established after the parties' 
marriage. But that does not distinguish it from Dr. Dunn's 
professional corporation, which was also established after the 
parties' marriage. Moreover, Mr. Lee acquired his interest in his 
new business with the proceeds of another business interest which 
he brought into the marriage. Like Dr. Dunn, he claimed that the 
new business was not a marital asset because it was a continuation 
of a premarital enterprise. This court rejected that argument. 
Thus, under the precedents of Gardner, Sorenson and Lee, it was 
clear error for the trial court to exclude the hard assets of Dr. 
Dunn's professional corporation from the marital estate without 
valuation. 
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C. The District Court's Treatment Of Retirement 
Benefits Accumulated During The Marriage Had An 
Inequitable Effect, 
The Utah supreme court and this court have established 
that retirement benefits accumulated during a marriage may only be 
divided based upon their present value at the time of trial i_f the 
trial court makes specific findings of their present value and 
provides a method and reasons for an immediate distribution. 
Bailey v. Bailev, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987); Ravburn v. 
Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). If either of those 
requirements is not satisfied, the benefits should be divided on 
the basis of a fixed percentage, with a formula determining the 
benefits accumulated during the marriage. Woodward v. Woodward, 
supra: Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). In 
this case, a present value analysis was improper because there was 
no competent evidence of the value of Dr. Dunn's retirement 
benefits at the time of trial, and no provision was made nor 
reasons given for any immediate distribution to Mrs. Dunn. 
(1) The Trial Court Made No Provision For Immediate 
Distribution To Mrs. Dunn. The Brief of Respondents assumes that 
the trial court provided for immediate distribution to Mrs. Dunn 
of the fixed amounts it awarded her. That is not the case. In 
fact, Mrs. Dunn's motion for clarification of that precise issue 
was denied by the trial court. R000147, 000161-64, 000203-04. 
(2) There Was No Competent Evidence Of The Value Of The 
Retirement Benefits At The Time Of Trial. Respondents do not 
dispute that the trial court's analysis of the retirement benefits 
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rested on outdated accountings as of February 19, 1987 for the 
Shriner's Hospital Plan, March 31, 1987 for the professional 
corporation's retirement plan, and December 31, 1987 for the 
TIAA-CREF Plan. There was no evidence of the value of those 
benefits at the time of the May 1988 trial, although additional 
contributions had admittedly been made after the dates of the 
accountings produced by Dr. Dunn. R000240 at 55. 
Respondents concede that Utah law requires valuations at 
the time of trial for a present value analysis. Nevertheless, 
they ask this court to affirm the trial court's valuation without 
such evidence based upon the parties purported "stipulation- to 
the outdated valuations. Brief of Respondents at 27. The parties 
did stipulate to the value of Dr. Dunn's retirement benefits as of 
February, March and December, 1987, but there was no stipulation 
that those amounts constituted competent evidence of their present 
value at the time of trial or provided a proper basis for a 
present value analysis. The Stipulation simply recorded the 
values reflected in the old accountings. R000102. The use of 
such outdated information as evidence of present value is 
reversible error under Berqer v. Berqer, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), 
and Marchant v. Marchant, supra. 
(3) The Trial Court Overvalued Defendant's Premarital 
Interests In His Retirement Funds. Mrs. Dunn makes no claims to 
the $21,573 in the TIAA-CREF Plan and $21,600 in Shriner's 
Hospital Plan which Dr. Dunn accrued before their marriage. But 
the trial court's exclusion of another $61,896 in the TIAA-CREF 
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Plan and $29,012 in the Shriner's Hospital Plan which accrued 
after the marriage, based on purported accumulations on the 
premarital interests, was not based on competent evidence. Mr. 
Barnett testified that he calculated those amounts based upon 
hurried telephone calls to clerical employees of the plans. 
R000241 at 93-97. This double hearsay testimony was unsupported 
by any corroborating evidence. In fact, Dr. Dunn admitted that he 
had never kept records of his premarital interests or any accruals 
on them. R000240 at 56-57. Under those circumstances, $90,918 in 
benefits accrued during the marriage should not have been treated 
as his premarital property. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 Utah 
(1986). 
(4) The Overall Division Of Dr. Dunn's Retirement 
Benefits Was Inequitable. At the time of trial, Dr. Dunn had more 
than $570,542 accumulated in his three retirement plans; and 
over $527,369 of that amount had been accumulated during the 
marriage. Yet, Mrs. Dunn was awarded only $143,372, or less than 
27 percent, of that amount. Given the lack of any competent 
evidence to establish the amounts attributable to premarital and 
marital contributions, it was unfair to exclude another $90,918 as 
separate property and award Dr. Dunn two-thirds of the remainder. 
See Marchant v. Marchant, supra. 
6
 This includes $244,054 in the professional corporation's 
plan as of March 31, 1987, $204,472 in the TIAA-CREF Plan as of 
December 31, 1987, and $122,016 in the Shriner's Hospital Plan as 
of February 19, 1987. Trial Exhibit D-25. 
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D. The Credits Against The Promissory Note, 
Airplane And Automobiles Had An Inequitable 
EffQQt. 
The trial court granted Dr. Dunn substantial credits 
against an airplane, automobiles, and a promissory note which were 
acquired during the marriage. Although the Cessna was purchased 
in 1983 and 88 percent of its cost was admittedly paid from 
marital income, R000241 at 28-29, Trial Exhibit P-7, the trial 
court excluded $26,000 or 88 percent, of its value from the 
marital estate. This $26,000 credit for a premarital airplane was 
not based upon any competent evidence of that plane's value at the 
time of the marriage. R000240 at 63-65; R000241 at 89-90; Trial 
Exhibits P-7, D-24, D-25. 
The trial court also gave Dr. Dunn a net credit of $6,600 
against a Porsche purchased by the professional corporation in 
1986, and a 1983 Blazer purchased with marital income. This 
credit was based upon a car owned at the time of the marriage, 
although there was no competent evidence of its value in 1977, and 
Dr. Dunn admitted that he had commingled the proceeds with marital 
assets. R000241 at 58, 88-89, Trial Exhibits D-24, D-25. 
Finally, the trial court excluded $22,493 of the value of a 
promissory note and trust deed which the parties acquired in 1984, 
although those instruments were held in their joint names and the 
payments on the note were deposited into their joint account. 
R000240 at 59-60; Trial Exhibits D-24, D-25. By removing another 
$55,093 from the marital estate, these credits further exacerbated 
the disproportion in the property division. 
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Respondents cite Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 
(Utah 1988), and Newmever v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 
1987), to support those credits. Brief of Respondents at 30. But 
neither of those cases supports their position. 
Mortensen established that while separate property should 
generally be awarded to the spouse who brings it into the 
marriage, that rule does not apply where the property has been 
commingled or exchanged or when the acquiring spouse has made a 
gift of an interest in that property to the other spouse. Id., 
760 P.2d at 307-09. That is precisely what the record reflects 
with respect to the promissory note, airplane, and automobiles. 
In Newmeyer, there was competent evidence that the wife 
had inherited $55,000 to $60,000, which she had invested in the 
purchase of the parties' home. The court credited her with the 
amount of the inheritance, but divided the appreciation on the 
home equally. 111., 745 P.2d at 1278. Significantly, the Utah 
supreme court upheld that ruling on the ground that the overall 
property distribution was equitable: 
The overriding consideration is that the ultimate 
division be equitable — that property be fairly 
divided between the parties, given their 
contributions during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of the divorce. 
Id., 745 P.2d at 1278 (citations omitted). That overriding 
consideration was violated in this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A trial court's property division will be overturned 
"where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error or where 
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there has been such an abuse of discretion that an inequity or 
injustice has resulted." Beraer v. Beraer, 713 P.2d 695/ 697 
(Utah 1985). That is clearly what occurred in this case. 
Consequently, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed and the case should be remanded for a redistribution 
of the marital estate in accordance with the decision of this 
court. 
Dated this 31st day of March, 1989. 
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